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Key lessons
The conservation of biodiversity on private land is both a high 
priority and a considerable challenge. An effective response to 
this challenge requires a combination of legislative and incentive 
mechanisms, coupled with preparedness by government to review 
and revise administrative arrangements. Preliminary results from the 
Environmental Stewardship Program, established by the Australian 
Government, highlight that there is a role for market-based approaches. 
However, implementation of this program through a Commonwealth 
bureaucracy was not without its challenges. Here we provide an 
overview of the program’s implementation from 2007 to 2012, followed 
by discussion of some key lessons learned. 
We summarise these lessons as:
• Designing for the long-term presents many challenges.
• Land managers liked the program but there were a few surprises.
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
34
• Monitoring is important.
• Start simple and engage early and often.
• Governance and administrative reforms are needed.
Figure 3.1: A sign on the gate of a property involved in the 
Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project, part of the Environmental 
Stewardship Program. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
Introducing the Environmental Stewardship 
Program
In mid-2007, the Commonwealth established the Environmental 
Stewardship Program, a ground-breaking scheme that used competitive 
tenders to engage private land managers in long-term contracts 
(up to 15 years) to manage environmental assets of high public value. 
The  program resulted in a series of tenders being implemented by 
the Commonwealth across New South Wales, Queensland, and South 
Australia. We were involved in the design and implementation of 
the program and, more than most, we are aware of the challenging 
ecological, social, and economic dimensions of designing and 
implementing such a process. Here we reflect on the experience and 
offer several lessons that may help with the design of similar schemes 
in the future.
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The Environmental Stewardship Program initiated a new way for the 
Commonwealth to support the conservation of biodiversity on private 
land, through a process where land managers were empowered and 
funded to be recognised as environmental stewards.
Being a Commonwealth initiative meant funding was targeted at 
matters of National Environmental Significance as listed under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC).1 
Therefore, the program was only permitted to target nationally 
threatened species and ecological communities, migratory species and 
wetlands of international importance, and natural values associated 
with world and national heritage places.
Aligning a market-based incentive scheme to clear Commonwealth 
legal responsibilities for biodiversity conservation was critical to 
gaining initial approval for the program. Depending on the assets 
targeted, the program sought to achieve a range of outcomes including: 
• Improved habitat quality across the landscape.
• Increased viability, integrity, and buffers to high quality remnants 
for species, ecological communities, Ramsar wetlands, and World 
Heritage areas.
• Improved long-term protection of nationally threatened species 
and ecological communities.
• Improved condition and function of ecological communities.
• Enduring changes in land manager attitudes and behaviours 
towards environmental protection and sustainable land 
management practices.
The initial funding for the program was $42.5 million from 2007/08 
to 2010/11, with a contingency reserve to allow annual payments 
until 2024/25 (a contingency reserve for a program represents funds 
committed for the program beyond the standard three-year forward 
estimates period). In the 2011 budget, the Commonwealth announced 
additional funding of $84.2 million from 2011/12 for a further four 
years. However, no further funding rounds were offered after 2012. 
1  Note, not all departmental programs need to target matters of National Environmental 
Significance. They can have their constitutional basis through external affairs powers — 
helping the Australian Government meet their international obligations under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, for example.
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In the implementation phase of the program (2007–2012), managers 
designed and delivered the competitive tenders through two projects 
in collaboration with on-ground delivery agents and external 
scientific experts: the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project and the 
Multiple Ecological Communities Project. Both projects, which 
comprised the entire program, employed a reverse auction tender 
process (see Zammit et al. 2010), which resulted in a total government 
investment of approximately $152 million in approved grants with 
individual land managers up to 2025/26. Landowner contributions 
remain uncosted, but are likely to be significant.
From 2007–2009, the program targeted the critically endangered box 
gum grassy woodland ecological community in south east Australia 
through the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project. This project targeted 
the remaining patches of woodland on private land, without specific 
reference to the adjoining matrix of agricultural lands or other non-
target native habitats. In total, five tender rounds across New South 
Wales and Queensland were conducted under the Box Gum Grassy 
Woodland Project, resulting in 26,470 ha being managed by 210 land 
managers for an approximate cost of $71 million over 15 years. 
Program managers recognised an opportunity to increase the 
program’s efficiency through experience gained from implementing 
the Box  Gum Grassy Woodland Project; desktop research; staff 
expertise (see, for example, Attwood et al. 2009); and formal review 
and structured feedback mechanisms with delivery agents and 
land managers.
Consequently, they sought to improve program design by broadening 
the program’s reach through targeting multiple EPBC-listed ecological 
communities in a region, and incorporating options for conservation 
management of the surrounding matrix through buffers and 
connectivity. These program refinements were subsequently found to 
have improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation 
model (see, for example, Marsden Jacobs Associates 2010). 
In 2010–2011, the program implemented the Multiple Ecological 
Communities Project in New South Wales and South Australia, across 
six different Natural Resource Management Regions. Five nationally 
threatened ecological communities were targeted: in New South Wales, 
basalt and alluvial grassland, weeping Myall woodland, and box gum 
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grassy woodland; in South Australia, iron-grass grassland, and 
peppermint box woodland. In 2011–2012, a second round of the 
Multiple Ecological Communities Project was implemented in South 
Australia. In total, after these two tender rounds, 87 land managers 
were contracted to manage 26,988 ha of threatened ecological 
communities, which included over 7,000 ha of adjoining land for an 
approximate cost of $81.3 million over 15 years.
Relative to the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project, the development 
of the Multiple Ecological Communities Project recognised the need 
for a more integrated and landscape-scale approach to conserving 
threatened ecological communities. As such, more technically nuanced 
protocols and tools were required (Whitten et al. 2011). These, in 
turn, required more sophisticated management planning with land 
managers. Building on the successful uptake of the Box Gum Grassy 
Woodland Project and Multiple Ecological Communities Project, 
the program managers commenced designing a more generic reverse 
auction framework that targeted native vegetation (habitat), which 
supported nationally threatened species and ecological communities. 
Under this approach, the program could then be rolled out without 
specifying a precise target, but rather allowing land managers with 
different assemblages of EPBC-listed species and communities on their 
properties to participate in a tender round. This approach was never 
implemented, given the Commonwealth’s decision not to undertake 
further funding rounds of the program. 
In summary, after five years of implementation, 297 land managers 
across New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia were 
approved by the Commonwealth to implement (up to) 15-year 
conservation management plans over 56,527 ha of private land. 
The last  of these contracts will end in 2026/27. The realisation 
of the potential conservation benefits from a public investment 
of approximately $152.3 million will depend on how these contracts 
are managed, and how land managers are supported. 
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Figure 3.2: A reptile monitoring station within a Box Gum 
Grassy Woodland Project site. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
The program can justifiably be called groundbreaking because it 
required a longer-term perspective to the management of grants 
than has customarily been taken by Commonwealth governments. 
Consequently, the program contained many innovations, which were 
developed and implemented in a relatively short period of time. 
As we look back on what was achieved, we believe there are several 
important lessons for policymakers seeking to set up similar schemes 
in the future.
Designing for the long-term presents 
many challenges 
The original design of the program that supported long term payments 
for conservation management on private land was a significant 
achievement. The original budget — for the full funding term to 
2026 — contained the necessary allocations for outsourcing the 
management of tenders to third-party providers, environmental and 
social monitoring, compliance, and extension support. 
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Retaining these features adequately through the implementation 
and maintenance phases of the program proved to be difficult due 
to a combination of factors, including budget pressures, changes 
in department staff, and changes in priorities and attitudes within 
government and the department towards how the program should 
best be managed. For example, the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project 
featured ecological and social monitoring, and externally contracted 
delivery agents to manage site assessments and provided ongoing 
extension support to land managers. However, the Multiple Ecological 
Communities Project had few of these features. The challenge was 
presented by the fact that governments always retain the prerogative to 
reallocate limited funds, and other resources — and to shift priorities 
as circumstances change.
The translation of policy decisions into programs with long-term 
budgets can be difficult to maintain successfully over time. Original 
planning cannot deliver intended results without the institutional 
commitment and enduring support to implement a program as 
intended. This is a reflection of the vulnerability of agreed government 
policies and investment programs to shifting political ideologies and 
their preferences. Such shifts can limit long-term policy coherence in 
favour of short-term flexibility. This can, in turn, limit opportunities 
for securing enduring long-term environmental improvements. 
The major challenge for any future agri-environmental program will 
therefore be securing enduring bi-partisan political support, combined 
with institutional governance arrangements that make it more robust 
to withstand short-term pressures and shifting attitudes. 
Land managers liked the program 
but there were a few surprises
Land manager feedback
The program was popular with land managers (Coggan et al. 2013; 
Ecker  and Thompson 2010; Marsden Jacobs Associates 2010). 
The features of the program prompting the most positive feedback 
from land managers were site assessments and ongoing monitoring, 
information packs and evenings, and the use of state-and-transition 
models, which were used to explain the desired conservation 
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outcomes. Zammit et al. (2010) and Attwood and Burns (2012) provide 
further information on the use of state-and-transition models by the 
program. Zammit (2013a) outlines the social benefits to farmers from 
participating in incentive programs for conservation. Here we focus 
on land manager feedback, with selected quotes from land managers 
from semi-structured interviews.
To some, the offer of 15-year contracts was appealing; to others it 
was daunting. Some found the Commonwealth’s interest (through 
weighting  in the metric) in conservation covenants —  deeds to 
land titles that define the limitations, conditions, or restrictions 
on the use of that land in perpetuity (see www.environment.gov.
au/topics/biodiversity/biodiversity-conservation/conservation-
covenants) — was a barrier to participation, even though it was not 
a requirement to participate. 
Many land managers were proud of their involvement and thought 
the department should go further to develop a brand for the program 
(something akin to current organic farming branding). The department 
did provide them with signs for display on properties (e.g. gates) that 
recognised their participation in the program, but did not develop 
a brand. As yet, there is no evidence of a clear market advantage 
to properties that have participated in such schemes, but as such 
schemes mature, the competitive advantages of products that arise 
from participating properties might be more evident:
I would like to see stewardship branded as a premium product. 
We  have happy sheep and look after the environment — wouldn’t 
you want to buy that wool?
Some saw the reverse auction process as confusing and undesirable:
I had a hard time coming up with a bid price because I didn’t know 
what I was doing. Why don’t you just tell us a flat price then we can 
decide if it is worth it?
At the outset, managers did not know a reasonable price to make 
direct offers, but after running multiple rounds within a region, there 
was sufficient price information for direct offers. This approach had 
already been successfully used in the Commonwealth’s Tasmanian 
Forest Conservation Fund (Binney and Zammit 2010).
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Some felt the management plans developed were too prescriptive 
and should be outcome-based rather than input-focused:
Rather than tell us what to do, you should have a hands-on person 
come around and pay us a bonus if we are getting the outcome 
you want.
A few surprises
Implementation of the program produced some surprises, including 
a large number of requests for site assessments. For example, the 
Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project had initially budgeted for 
150 site assessments, but received over 350 requests in round one. 
Project managers were further surprised by some applications worth 
millions of dollars over the contract period. To address this, managers 
introduced a capped total bid amount (e.g. $3.5 million maximum over 
15 years for the Multiple Ecological Communities Project). 
From initial rounds, project managers discovered that land managers 
were generally costing their bids linearly. As efficiencies were 
expected, this made large holdings more expensive than anticipated. 
As the program was rolled out, concern grew within the department 
regarding what was an appropriate $/ha/year figure for management. 
The concern was that, in many cases, it could be cheaper to purchase 
the property, as was the approach for funding the purchase and 
covenanting of private land through a state government or private 
entity under the National Reserve System. Under that approach, the 
new owner carries the ongoing costs to implement the conservation 
management plan.
In response to this concern, the Australian Government’s 
Evaluation Panel (which was responsible for overseeing the process 
and  recommending successful tenderers to ministers) developed 
a $/ha/year cap as a red flag when evaluating Multiple Ecological 
Communities Project bids. This figure was informed by cost data from 
existing Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project contracts, such as the 
average annual cost and the variation from the mean. This information 
is commercial-in-confidence. However, in a commissioned review, 
Marsden Jacobs Associates (2010) reported that across the Box Gum 
Grassy Woodland Project, the average annual cost was $202 per hectare 
per year, with significant variation around the average both within 
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and between regions. The actual figure used was not communicated 
to land managers, but the Evaluation Panel’s discretionary powers 
to support their responsibility to make the best value for money 
judgements was communicated in the program guidelines (see, for 
example, nrmonline.nrm.gov.au/catalog/mql:2408).
Monitoring is important
In recognising that several kinds of monitoring and engagement 
activities are needed, a set of monitoring tools and approaches were 
developed for the program. These aimed to:
• Provide feedback to land managers to engage them to increase 
their understanding of the program and its aims, and to engender 
positive attitudes towards the environment.
• Provide information for compliance checking, risk management, 
grant acquittal requirements, and departmental reporting for the 
program.
• Provide rigorous evidence for the performance of the program 
in achieving its conservation and attitudinal change outcomes.
A structured approach should highlight the benefits from the 
investment, and the positive behaviours and attitudes of those 
participating. Critical components include annual (short term) 
compliance reporting by land managers against contracted obligations; 
longer term ecological monitoring to reveal ecological improvements; 
and longer term social monitoring to track changes in attitudes and 
priorities to biodiversity conservation among farmers. 
These monitoring systems are coupled with extension support, which 
gives land managers somewhere to go for advice, and provides them 
with opportunities to build capacity and share their learnings with 
other land managers, researchers and government. Finally, monitoring 
systems require regular independent auditing of a proportion 
of  contracts to help detect and deal with fraudulent activity at an 
early stage.
The lack of fit-for-purpose long-term biodiversity monitoring has 
been a source of considerable criticism, from both scientific and 
policy perspectives, of agri-environment schemes in Europe, as well 
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as earlier conservation initiatives in Australia (Kleijn and Sutherland 
2003; Morrison et al. 2010; Lindenmayer et al. 2012). In recognising 
these shortcomings, the program contracted The Australian National 
University to undertake scientific monitoring of woodland sites on 153 
farms in New South Wales and southern Queensland (Lindenmayer 
et al. 2012). Securing this monitoring project was a significant 
policy achievement, and was vital for determining progress towards 
achieving the program objective and desired outcomes. 
Figure 3.3: A native skink found in a monitoring station 
in a Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project site. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
The monitoring project had an initial budget of $2 million over 
four years. In 2013, the project was re-funded, but at half its initial 
budget. Consequently, the size of the monitoring has been adjusted 
by introducing rotational sampling, as described in Lindenmayer 
et al. (2012). In addition, some sites are no longer visited, such as those 
for which property ownership has changed and stewardship payments 
are no longer being made. Despite these changes, the monitoring 
project is still considered appropriate to assess many aspects of change 
in certain groups of biota, and woodland condition.
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The results of the monitoring project are provided to the department in 
annual reports. These reports include evidence-based recommendations 
for alterations to the prescribed Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project 
grazing regime. To date, results from the monitoring indicate that 
the areas of vegetation being managed are on a different trajectory 
to the controls (currently being prepared for publication). More time 
is needed to understand these trajectories, but early indications are 
that the management plans are effective in achieving conservation 
outcomes. (See Kay et al. 2013 for an insight into reptile and amphibian 
assemblages at these sites.)
Start simple and engage early and often
When seeking to establish a new biodiversity market, it makes sense 
to begin with a simple investment target, but one that is sufficiently 
recognisable and widespread to ensure a reasonable number of eligible 
participants. In the case of the Environmental Stewardship Program, 
the targeted asset was box gum grassy woodlands. This critically 
endangered ecosystem is distinctive and widely spread from north 
eastern Victoria across western NSW and into southern Queensland. 
Building on the targeting of a single asset (i.e. box gum grassy 
woodlands), one can then use early learnings to improve effectiveness 
and efficiency through increasing the amount of land secured 
and decreasing the administrative costs associated with program 
management. In the case of the Environmental Stewardship Program, 
this led to introducing multiple ecological communities into the 
reverse-auction process, and thereafter to the design of a more generic, 
habitat-based approach to tender design. The habitat-based approach 
leads logically into more explicit consideration of how landscape-scale 
outcomes can be secured through formal inclusion of opportunities 
for creating corridors and other kinds of functional connectivity 
(see Chapter 11 for Geoff Kay’s discussion on how the landscape-scale 
of an agri-environment program can affect outcomes).
Agri-environment schemes and markets for biodiversity are a novel 
idea to many land managers, so misinterpretation of the process and 
resulting contracts is a risk. It is important to investigate concerns 
early and to regularly engage with land managers. It is also important 
to use simple tools to communicate program intentions, operational 
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guidelines, and contractual conditions. As understanding grows 
and early successes become evident within rural communities, there 
is significant opportunity to build land manager capabilities for 
biodiversity conservation on their properties and to cultivate new 
social networks around these environmental assets. This is because 
some of the biophysical and social benefits from stewardship projects 
could be privately captured (i.e. be of personal rather than public 
benefit). This should help facilitate the acceptance of such programs 
within land manager communities (see Chapter 10 on restoring 
ecosystem services on private farmland).
Governance and administrative reforms 
are needed
Several independent reviews provided valuable insights and generally 
concluded that the program was well designed (Ecker and Thompson 
2010; Marsden Jacob Associates 2010; Whitten et al. 2011). During this 
time, it was also well regarded by the ministers for the environment, 
the scientific community, many farmers, and the National Farmers 
Federation. The program proved successful in targeting threatened 
ecological communities, and in highlighting the role played by other 
native habitats and the surrounding agricultural matrix in market-
based conservation management on private land. 
There were other benefits for the department in meeting its legislative 
requirements under EPBC, including improved knowledge of the 
location, condition, and extent of certain threatened ecological 
communities, with flow on benefits to recovery planning processes. 
Most recently, a senate committee inquiry into threatened species 
protection endorsed the Environmental Stewardship Program, and 
recommended longer time frames for funding (see recommendations 




For all these benefits, however, there were also considerable challenges, 
and the Commonwealth closed the program to further investment 
rounds in 2012. While the authors do not know the reasons why the 
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program ceased further investment after two successful projects, we 
speculate several factors had some influence on that decision. As a 
relatively small and discrete investment, the program was vulnerable 
to cost-savings efforts during the more restrictive fiscal budgets from 
2012. Second, the program never secured the political support of the 
mainstream environmental non-government organisations during its 
life, so no pressure was placed on government by them when funding 
was under threat. 
The program, as originally approved, was designed to be innovative 
in addressing the long-term management of specific matters of 
national environmental significance on private land. But the realities 
of implementing an innovative conservation program through a 
Commonwealth bureaucracy, with rigid business processes, were 
broadly underestimated. Essentially, implementing reverse auctions 
was demanding because running a cycle of market-tenders inside a 
broader culture based around funding open-call public grants caused 
a range of procedural and time-critical constraints.
There was also the issue of dealing with scientific knowledge and 
its application, something essential in designing a program aimed 
at sustaining complex threatened ecosystems. The Commonwealth 
successfully administers a number of technically and scientifically 
complex policy areas (e.g. the Bureau of Meteorology, Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority, and the Antarctic Division within the 
Department of the Environment) which are resourced and willing to 
support scientific research and analysis in policy design and program 
management. However, this kind of approach to scientific knowledge 
and its application was not fully adopted for the Environmental 
Stewardship Program. Rather, it was delivered through the Caring 
for our Country (CfoC) initiative, and administered by a bureaucracy 
with a primary focus on managing a large and complex national 
grants program. (CfoC involved spending $2 billion over four years.) 
However, an administrative culture more akin to those in the above 
Commonwealth areas, which have a strong scientific focus, will be 
critical to designing and implementing any future national agri-
environment scheme successfully over an enduring period.
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Institutional learning is a slow and iterative process, with inevitable 
pockets of resistance to change. Governance and administrative 
arrangements need to be made more responsive and adaptive to 
implementing new policy innovations — with scientific underpinnings 
— if there is a genuine commitment to significant policy reform. 
Policy reform will take a long time, and will be built step by step 
through innovation and experimentation. The Environmental 
Stewardship Program experience showed that, although governments 
demonstrate that they are sometimes willing to try new ways to 
protect biodiversity, their administrative arrangements are often so 
inflexible that they stifle the original innovative idea and approach. 
Innovative policy instruments need to be supported by more flexible 
and adaptive governance arrangements and an enduring commitment 
to credible scientific input. If this can be achieved, governments will 
be best placed to successfully implement market-based conservation 
initiatives.
Summary
Despite the challenges, we consider that the lessons learnt from the 
Environmental Stewardship Program can usefully inform future 
agri-environment schemes implemented by governments. Our key 
recommendations for any future public-funded and market-based 
program are:
1. Design and implement fit-for-purpose business processes and 
staff management strategies up front. Procurement plans that 
allow for ongoing provision of external services are needed, 
and  land manager  contracts should not be considered grants 
(and be regulated under grant guidelines). Rather, they should be 
commercial fee-for-service contracts to promote a business culture 
reflective of the service(s) the government is purchasing. 
2. Focus on developing a more generic approach to maximising 
high-value biodiversity outcomes for as many priority investment 
targets (e.g. threatened species or ecological communities) as 
possible. A generic approach targeting habitat for multiple species/
communities will minimise the knowledge intensity of program 
design. That is, it will reduce the need for species-specific or 
community-specific conservation value metrics and management 
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plans. This approach could also easily accommodate the design 
principles of the Multiple Ecological Communities Project, including 
conservation management actions in the adjoining matrix at little 
additional cost (Whitten et al. 2011). 
3. Any habitat-based approach should continue to develop greater 
landscape-scale connectivity between properties and across 
catchments (Zammit 2013b). This can be achieved by designing 
biodiversity markets that also support corridor development and 
continue to manage the agriculture matrix more sympathetically 
for conservation.
4. A greater emphasis needs to be given to the development of 
conservation management plans and appropriate performance 
assessment of their effectiveness. In particular, different grazing 
management strategies used by any new agri-environment scheme 
should be monitored and compared, to inform future programs. 
5. A direct offers option can be implemented once sufficient market 
price information is available. Subject to considering other 
conservation priorities and the availability of funds, there is scope 
to offer additional interested land managers a fixed $/ha/year rate, 
and thereby improve efficiency and increase the area managed for 
biodiversity. A direct offer is a one-off offer of a contract by the 
government to a land manager with a stipulated price, duration, 
and management plan. The price is based on modelling price 
information from successful bids in previous tenders (see Binney 
and Zammit 2010 for a forest example). These land managers would 
hold an asset of quantified biodiversity value, as they would 
have participated in the initial aspects of a previous tender but 
either withdrew or were not successful. The subsequent fixed-
price scheme would improve the return on investment for the 
program, which has high upfront costs because of the initial 
assessments, developing a suitable conservation value metric, and 
management plans.
Finally, a valuable outcome that the Commonwealth secured through 
this program (in addition to the hectares being managed) were the 
relationships forged with the contracted land managers and developed 
with the CSIRO and ANU. These relationships should be nurtured 
to foster further learning and trust (Gibbons et al. 2008). Effective 
conservation will come from mutual respect and common goals — the 
implementation phase of the program has provided the framework, 
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but ongoing land manager support to 2025/26 is needed for enduring 
success. The more educational support provided to generate effective 
conservation outcomes, the more likely it is that land managers will 
believe in the benefits of a change in management practice. This will 
become critical for the maintenance of asset condition beyond 2025/26, 
although regulatory frameworks which prevent wilful degradation of 
protected assets will also play a role, as will conservation covenants 
for a number of properties.
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